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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shane Lee Dobbs appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence with a
persistent violator enhancement.

Dobbs claims the district court erred in

overruling his objection to a statement made during the prosecutor's rebuttal
argument.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officers responded to a report of an altercation at Dobbs' residence. (Trial
Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.10.) When officers arrived, they saw smashed glass in
the living room, blood on several walls, and the back door appeared to have
been kicked inward. (Trial Tr., p.33, L.1 - p.35, L.16.) There was also a blood
trail leading out to the shed and blood on the open shed door. (Trial Tr., p.35,
Ls.22-24.) However, there was nobody at the residence. (Trial Tr., p.35, L.17 p.36, L.5.) Further investigation revealed that the male and female who lived in
the home (Dobbs and his girlfriend), left in a vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.6-22.)
Approximately 20 minutes later, Dobbs' vehicle was located on Highway
44 and Deputy Heather Leavell conducted a traffic stop with the assistance of
Corporal Paul Maund. (Trial Tr., p.37, L.10 - p.39, L.13, p.48, L.23 - p.49, L.2.)
In talking with Dobbs, Corporal Maund noted an odor of alcohol coming from
Dobbs' "facial area." (Trial Tr., p.58, Ls.11-24.) Corporal Maund asked Dobbs
whether he had been drinking and Dobbs responded that he had had a "couple"
of 24-ounce beers "at least two hours" prior but had not eaten since that morning.
1

(Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.4-19, p.62, Ls.1-4.) Corporal Maund also noticed Dobbs had
red, glassy eyes. (Trial Tr., p.62, Ls.5-9.) Based on his suspicions that Dobbs
may have been driving under the influence, Corporal Maund decided to
administer field sobriety tests. (See Trial Tr., p.63, Ls.5-7.)
In preparing to administer the field sobriety tests, Corporal Maund asked
Dobbs whether he had any injuries, suffered any recent head trauma, or wore
glasses or contacts. (Trial Tr., p.62, L.12 - p.63, L.4.) Dobbs claimed he had a
knee injury but denied recent head trauma or vision correction. (Trial Tr., p.62,
L.12 - p.63, L.5.) Corporal Maund administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus
test and, in lieu of the one-leg-stand and walk-and-tum tests, which Corporal
Maund did not administer due to Dobbs' claimed physical impairments, Corporal
Maund had Dobbs perform the English alphabet and number count tests. (Trial
Tr., p.63, L.13 - p.64, L.19.)

Dobbs failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus,

scoring the maximum number of six decision points. (Trial Tr., p.70, Ls.17-22.)
Dobbs likewise failed the number count test, but correctly recited the alphabet
from C to Q as he was asked. (Trial Tr., p.71, L.18- p.74, L.12.)
Fifty minutes after the traffic stop was initiated, Corporal Maund conducted
breathalyzer testing.

(Trial Tr., p.77, L.1 - p.79, L.24, p.96, Ls.7-11.)

Dobbs'

BAC test results were .083 and .086. (Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.7-11.)
The state charged Dobbs with felony driving under the influence and a
persistent violator enhancement. 1 (R., pp.29-34, 53-54.) The jury found Dobbs
guilty of both felony DUI and the enhancement. (R., pp.93, 123-24.) The court
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The state also charged Dobbs with driving without privileges, which he pied
guilty to prior to trial. (See R., p.6; 6/20/2011 Tr., p.6, L.8- p.12, L.2.)
2

imposed a unified 15-year sentence with five years fixed.
Dobbs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.133-136.)

3

(R., pp.131-32.)

ISSUE
Dobbs states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by overruling Mr. Dobbs' objection during
rebuttal argument because the prosecutor committed misconduct
by misstating the evidence?
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Dobbs failed to establish the district court erred in overruling his
objection to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument given that the prosecutor's
argument was not objectionable?

4

ARGUMENT
Dobbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Overruling His Objection
To One Of The Prosecutor's Statements During Rebuttal
A.

Introduction
Dobbs claims the district court erred in overruling his objection to a

statement made during the prosecutor's rebuttal argument.
p.9.)

(Appellant's Brief,

Dobbs' claim of error is premised on the assertion that the prosecutor

misstated the evidence during her argument. Because Dobbs has failed to show
error in the prosecutor's statement, he has necessarily failed to demonstrate that
the district court erred in overruling his contemporaneous objection.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court

exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel.
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
A defendant who claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct has the
burden of proving such. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59, 253 P.3d 727, 733
(2011) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80
(2010)). If the alleged misconduct is followed by a contemporaneous objection,
and if the reviewing court finds error, the error is reviewed under the harmless
error standard.

!s:L (citing Perry at 227, 245 P.3d at 979).
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C.

Dobbs Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Overruling His
Objection To A Statement Made During The Prosecutor's Rebuttal
Argument Since The Objected-To Statement Did Not Constitute
Misconduct
Dobbs testified at trial that, after he and his girlfriend got in a fight at their

house, they went to his friend Chris Caudle's house. (Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.10-24.)
Despite what he told Corporal Maund about his alcohol consumption that
evening, at trial Dobbs testified that he stayed at Chris' house for "under an hour"
and, while he was there and letting his dog outside, he saw some whiskey on the
kitchen counter with a disposable red Dixie cup conveniently located nearby.
(Trial Tr., p.209, L.25 - p.211, L.15.) Dobbs testified he was "pretty upset" and
decided to drink "some whiskey." (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.14-15.) Dobbs said he did
not feel intoxicated when he left Chris' house, but he started feeling the effects of
the alcohol "a little ways into ... the traffic stop" that happened after he left Chris'
house to go home. (Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.3-13.) When asked why he told Corporal
Maund a different story about his alcohol consumption, Dobbs responded:
"because I thought that if I told an officer while I'm pulled over on the side of the
road I just barely took a couple shots of whiskey, how is that going to sound?
was incredibly scared." (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.6-10.)
The prosecutor, in her initial closing argument, responded to Dobbs' trial
testimony, stating:
At Chris', Chris didn't see him drink. r21 He now claims that he
drank there. This is his greatest friend, and he was upset, he just
2

Chris was called as a witness by the state and testified that he never saw
Dobbs drink at his house. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.16-19.) However, Chris noted he
leaves his whiskey on the kitchen counter such that it was possible Dobbs could
have had some. {Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.19-23.)
6

had a fight, and he didn't drink with his friend? His friend didn't see
him drink? That doesn't make sense.

From the beginning, [Corporal] Maund sees signs of
investigation -- sees signs of intoxication, sees bloodshot, glassy
eyes and smells the odor of alcohol on him. [Dobbs] can't pass the
divided attention tests. And he utterly fails the nystagmus test.
You know that he didn't drink for the 50 minutes of the stop. You
know that he had an empty stomach. Even if you believe that he
chugged whiskey and immediately got in the car, you know,
scientifically, that whiskey had been absorbed at that time. So you
know his blood alcohol level was dropping.
The defendant would have you believe that he played beat
the clock and chugged a bunch of whiskey and then raced home so
that he could get home before he was too drunk? That doesn't
make sense ....
(Trial Tr., p.231, L.7 - p.232, L.14.)
Counsel for Dobbs then argued, in relevant part:
The State is trying to convince you that because of -- the
breath test in this case, it was over the legal limit, they broke the
plane of the goal line. Where was the ball, though? The ball is
back there when he was driving. Okay? The State doesn't have to
prove that he was over the legal limit when he took the test, that
[sic] he was over the legal limit when he was driving, some 50
minutes before.
Now, you've seen a lot of evidence. You've seen the graph
of absorption and elimination. You've heard a lot of testimony
about how reliable the instrument is. However, it takes, as [Mr.
Johnston, the forensic scientist] testified to, a sample at a specific
moment in time.
Now, we've talked about absorption, elimination, what are
the possibilities going back 50 minutes. It is entirely possible that
my client's alcohol concentration at the time he was driving was
well above what it was when he took the test. It's also possible that
it was significantly lower at the time he was driving than when he
took the test. The only way to really know for sure is where my
client is on this absorption and elimination graph. No one can tell
you where he was. Even he can't tell you were he was. It's a
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guess. For you to find my client guilty of driving with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or greater at the time he was driving, you have
to guess.
(Trial Tr., p.235, L.2 - p.236, L.6.)
The prosecutor responded in rebuttal with some of the same arguments
made in her initial closing:
The Defense is asking you to speculate on a lot of
information. You are to use your reason and common sense to
evaluate the evidence that is before you. You know that he had an
empty stomach. You know that he either stopped drinking two
hours before, or that he chugged a bunch of alcohol and then got in
the car, if you choose to believe that. You know that all of -- either
one of those, all that alcohol was absorbed by that point. His blood
alcohol was dropping. You know that.
(Trial Tr., p.242, Ls.12-22.)
At this point, defense counsel objected, asserting: 'There's no foundation
for that statement."

(Trial Tr., p.242, Ls.23-24.)

The court overruled the

objection. (Trial Tr., p.242, L.25.)
On appeal, Dobbs argues the district court erred in overruling his objection
to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, claiming the prosecutor misstated the
evidence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) More specifically, Dobbs contends the

prosecutor "committed misconduct by misstating the evidence when she
asserted that it was a known fact that Mr. Dobbs' blood alcohol level was higher
at the time of the stop than it was when he participated in the test." (Appellant's
Brief, p.11.)

Although that is not what the prosecutor actually said, even

accepting Dobbs' characterization of what was implied by the objected-to
statement, "His blood alcohol was dropping," Dobbs' claim that this misstated the
evidence is belied by the record.
8

Todd Johnston, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police, testified
that breath test results "tell you how much alcohol is in [someone's] system at the
time of the test." (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.19-21.) When asked what the results "tell
us about alcohol concentration at the time of a stop," versus the time the sample
was taken, Mr. Johnston responded:
Well, assuming that the officer that initiated the stop didn't
allow the individual to drink after a first contact, the body, as soon
as you start drinking alcohol, you start eliminating alcohol. So what
I can tell you is that during the -- after the initial stop, assuming that
they didn't consume any alcohol after that, their body is eliminating
alcohol that entire time. So their true alcohol concentration would
be higher than it was at the time of the test sometime later.
(Trial Tr., p.162, L.25 - p.163, L.11.)
Mr. Johnston's testimony supported the exact point of the prosecutor's
statement: "His blood alcohol was dropping." Dobbs claims otherwise, arguing,
"It is clear from [Mr. Johnston's] later testimony that this question assumed that a

person had finished absorbing alcohol and had moved on to elimination."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Although Dobbs' brief contains a number of excerpts
from Mr. Johnston's testimony (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-5, 10), he does not include
any specific citation to Mr. Johnston's testimony in support of his argument that
"later testimony" clarified "that this question assumed that a person had finished
absorbing alcohol and had moved on to elimination" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ). In
any event, Mr. Johnston's testimony does not support Dobbs' claim.
At no time did Mr. Johnston qualify his express opinion that, assuming
Dobbs had nothing to drink between the time of the traffic stop and the time the
breath tests were administered, which he did not, Dobbs' alcohol concentration

9

would have been "higher than it was at the time of the test sometime later." And,
notwithstanding Dobbs' assertions to the contrary, Mr. Johnston's testimony
regarding the process of alcohol absorption and elimination did not serve to
contradict or clarify that opinion in any manner, much less the manner suggested
by Dobbs.

The state can find no point in the transcript where Mr. Johnston

testified that an individual first completes the absorption process before moving
on to elimination. (See Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Rather, Mr. Johnston testified
that "as soon as you start drinking alcohol, you start eliminating alcohol." (Trial
Tr., p.163, Ls.4-5.) Mr. Johnston's testimony regarding absorption was simply
that absorption is the process by which alcohol diffuses into one's body, and that
absorption rates vary depending on how long the alcohol stays in the stomach,
which is impacted by whether there is food in your stomach because there is no
need to digest a liquid; if that is all that is in one's stomach, the stomach will
"dump the contents into [the] small intestines very quickly, and [all the alcohol
will] be fully absorbed ... within about 20 minutes on an empty stomach." (Trial
Tr., p.175, L.18 - p.177, L.6.) In other words, absorption, like elimination, is an
ongoing process that occurs simultaneously; one does not, as Dobbs suggests,
have to fully absorb all alcohol before "mov[ing] on to elimination." (Appellant's
Brief, p.11.) In fact, "in order to get your alcohol concentration to rise, you have
to consume alcohol faster than your body can metabolize it." (Trial Tr., p.163,
Ls.16-18.) Nothing in Mr. Johnston's opinion was modified by his explanation of
absorption and elimination.
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Moreover, Mr. Johnston's discussion of absorption and elimination, based
on the facts of this case, was entirely consistent with his opinion that someone in
Dobbs' position would have a higher BAC when he was driving than when he
provided the breath samples based on the absence of any additional ingestion of
alcohol and average rates for complete absorption on an empty stomach. The
prosecutor's objected-to statement was, therefore, an accurate comment based
on the evidence and not, as Dobbs, claims a misstatement of the evidence. See
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) ("Generally,
both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and
discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom.") (citations
omitted). That Dobbs urged the jury to reach a different conclusion regarding
Dobbs' BAC at the time he was driving (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), did not make the
prosecutor's comment improper or the district court's decision to overrule Dobbs'
objection erroneous.
Even if the Court concludes the district court erred in overruling the
objection the prosecutor's statement, this Court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's single complained-of statement did not
contribute to the jury's verdict. "[l]n order to find that the error was harmless and
not reversible," the appellate court "must declare a belief beyond a reasonable
doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict." Ellington, 151
Idaho at 59, 253 P.3d at 733 (citing Perry. 15.0 Idaho at 227-28, 245 P.3d at 97980).
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Not only was the prosecutor's rebuttal argument essentially the same as
her initial closing argument, to which Dobbs did not object, the court twice
instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. (R., pp.73, 107.) In
addition, the objected-to statement related only to Dobbs' blood alcohol content;
however, the state charged Dobbs with driving under the influence under two
alternative theories: (1) that Dobbs was driving under the influence; and/or (2)
that Dobbs had a BAC of .08 or more. (R., p.30.) The jury was instructed that it
could find Dobbs guilty under either theory (R., p.101), and the complained of
statement in no way implicates the non-BAC theory of guilt.

That said, even

under the theory that Dobbs was driving with a BAC in excess of .08, the
evidence that Dobbs' BAC was higher at the time he was driving than when he
was tested was strong given the information Dobbs provided to law enforcement
at the time regarding what he had eaten that day (or not eaten), when and what
he drank, and the scientific testimony of Mr. Johnston.

The only potentially

contradictory testimony was Dobbs' claim that he lied to the officers about when
and what he drank, which was his self-serving and essentially uncorroborated
claim that he drank whiskey at some unspecified time before getting in his car.
Given the charge, the evidence presented, and the jury instructions, even
assuming this Court finds error, the Court can easily conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt that the isolated, complained-of statement made during the
prosecutor's rebuttal did not contribute to the verdict.
Because Dobbs has failed to establish the objected-to statement made
during the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was improper, he has failed to
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demonstrate the district court erred in overruling his objection. Even if Dobbs
has met his burden of showing error, the alleged error was harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Dobb's judgment of
conviction for felony driving under the influence with a persistent violator
enhancement.
DATED this 29 th day of January, 2013.

JESSlqA . LORELLO
Deputy' torney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29 th day of January, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

y Attorney General
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